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The basic claim of the appellate division and the dissent in the
Court of Appeals was that since "qualified persons" are not subject
to this reduction, 294 there is no reason to believe that the legislature
deemed it allowable to so limit the insured. Moreover, logic would
seem to dictate that the insured be afforded greater benefits since
he, and not the qualified person, has paid a premium. This inconsistency of treatment might even be said to be so basic as to
deny the insured "equal protection of the laws." 295
It is clear that the framers of Article 17-A of the Insurance
Law intended no greater benefit to qualified persons in this regard.
Each person coming within the purview of this statute was to be afforded the same benefits as if his tortfeasor were covered by a $10,000
liability policy.2 99 Perhaps, as the Court of Appeals has stated, MVAIC's authority was meant to extend beyond mere technicality to a
broad scope of discretion in determining coverage. However, the
authority exercised by MVAIC herein and its affirmance by the
courts, would seem to be contrary to the basic purpose of the
statute.
MVAIC entitled to recover from insured person's action arising
from the same accident as prior arbitraton award- but
intervention under CPLR 1013 denied.
In McGee v. Horvat,297 plaintiff, an insured person, recovered

a $10,000 arbitration award for injuries inflicted by a hit-and-run
driver.
Thereafter, plaintiff brought suit against two insured
motorists who were involved in the same accident. MVAIC moved
to intervene under CPLR 1013 on the ground that it was entitled
to recover from any judgment to the extent of the payment made
to plaintiff. Defendant cross-moved to amend his answer to the
effect that his liability should be reduced by the arbitration award.
The second department held that MVAIC was entitled to
recover as of right.2 9 8 Since the statutory purpose of the MVAIC
law was to allow recovery as if the tortfeasor were covered by
a $10,000 liability policy,2 99 a double benefit, which would be effected
294 This was admitted by the majority in the instant case. Ibid. See N.Y.
Ixs. LAW § 610.
295 U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
29
6 McCarthy v. MVAIC, 16 App. Div. 2d 35, 38, 224 N.Y.S.2d 909,
913 (4th Dep't 1962), aff'd, 12 N.Y.2d 922, 188 N.E.2d 405, 238 N.Y.S.2d
101 (1963); see also N.Y. INs. LAW § 600(2).
29723 App. Div. 2d 271, 260 N.Y.S.2d 345 (2d Dep't 1965).
298 McGee v. Horvat, 23 App. Div. 2d 271, 274-75, 260 N.Y.S.2d 345, 349-50
(2d Dep't 1965). MVAIC's failure to appeal the unconditional affirmance
of the arbitrator's award was held insignificant. Id. at 275, 260 N.Y.S.2d
at 349.
299 See materials cited note 296 supra.
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by a contrary ruling herein, is improper. The court further stated
that defendant's claim was insufficient as a matter of law since
plaintiff paid an additional premium for this coverage and such
could not inure to the benefit of a tortfeasor. Thus, the MVAIC
award is strictly limited to those cases where injured persons can
get no liability recovery from anyone involved in the accident.
MVAIC's motion to intervene, however, was denied upon the
ground that the claim had no "common question of law or fact" 300
with the main action. Although CPLR 1013 involves permissible
intervention which necessarily is discretionary relief, it is not
clear that MVAIC's position did not fall thereunder. In any
event, it appears that MVAIC might have intervened as of right
under CPLR 1012(a) (2) since "the representation of the person's
[MVAIC's] interest . . . may be inadequate" and the person
may be affected adversely by the judgment.301
Despite obvious factual differences between the two cases considered, the treatment of common issues is susceptible of comparison. Durant ignored and McGee relied upon the statutory
purpose of MVAIC (i.e., recovery as if the unreachable tortfeasor
were covered by a $10,000 liability policy) to mitigate MVAIC's
liability to an insured person. In the former, the court failed
to note that in an ordinary action for negligence, workmen's compensation benefits would not reduce an award. In the latter,
however, this purpose was used to prevent a double benefit and
was also a supporting ground for denying the remission of a
tortfeasor's liability. In the McGee case, the court relied upon the
insured's payment of an additional premium as a possible mitigation
of damages by a tortfeasor. In Durant, however, this fact was
ignored so as to refuse an award to an insured which is guaranteed
by statute to a qualified person.
The sole element which ties the cases together is that, in both,
every effort is extended to find in favor of MVAIC. Whether
or not this tendency is appropriate is beyond the scope of this
analysis. It is clear, however, that certain changes need be
effected to offer a degree of consistency and stability to the judicial
treatment of MVAIC legislation.

300 CPLR 1013.
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CPLR 1012(a) (2).

